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Abstract: While much attention has been paid to the idea of displacement
in crime place theory and research, methodological problems associated with
its measurement have often been overlooked. We focus on such issues in the
context of immediate spatial displacement around hot spots of crime. Using
the Minneapolis Hot Spots Experiment (Sherman and Weisburd, 1995) as an
example, we identify specific problems investigators are likely to face in
documenting displacement effects. We argue that conventional studies are
unlikely to provide a powerful research design for examining displacement,
in part because of efforts to maximize the identification of main program
effects. In conclusion, we suggest that studies specifically designed for
measuring displacement (and the related phenomenon of diffusion) must be
developed if criminologists are to make significant advances in this area.
INTRODUCTION
The development of situational and environmental study in criminology
has long been impeded by the idea of displacement. At least from the time
of Sutherland (1947), the view held by most criminologists has been that
opportunities for criminality found in specific places or situations are a
minor feature of the crime equation. Criminal opportunities have been
assumed to exist in almost unlimited quantities, and offenders themselves
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are often portrayed as driven to crime and thus unlikely to be easily
deterred by simply reducing the opportunity structure for offending
(Clarke, 1992). Simply put, the prevailing orthodoxy in criminology for
much of this century has been that there is little point to concentrating
on opportunities for crime if offenders will simply displace the places,
times or targets of their offending (e.g., see Reppetto, 1976).
In recent years this prevailing orthodoxy, like many others in criminol-
ogy, has been the subject of substantial criticism. The idea that criminal
opportunities are widely spread through urban areas has been challenged
by a series of studies showing that crime is concentrated in time and space
(Brantingham and Brantingham, 1981; Bevon, 1984; Sherman et al.,
1989; Weisburd et al., 1992; Weisburd and Green, 1994). The portrait of
offenders as driven to criminality has also been replaced in good measure
by one that recognizes the situational, often serendipitous, character of
much offending (Cornish and Clarke, 1986). Even the assumption that
displacement is a routine occurrence of focused crime prevention efforts
has been replaced by agreement that displacement is seldom total and
often inconsequential (Gabor, 1990; Barr and Pease, 1990; Clarke, 1992;
Eck, 1993; Hesseling, 1993). Clarke and Weisburd (1994), moreover,
suggest that scholars need to take cognizance of just the reverse of
displacement. They point to evidence indicating that situational and
place-oriented crime prevention strategies often lead to a "diffusion of
benefits" to areas outside the immediate targets of intervention.
While much attention has been paid to the idea of displacement,
methodological problems associated with its measurement have often
been overlooked. This was to some extent understandable when it was
assumed that there would be little overall crime control benefit from
situational or environmental interventions, and relatively few academic
studies that focused on crime places or situations. But given the substan-
tial growth of such studies in recent years and the growing controversy
over the magnitude and nature of displacement, such focus is now
warranted.
Our discussion below focuses on methodological issues in the mea-
surement of immediate spatial displacement around hot spots of crime.
Using the Minneapolis Hot Spots Experiment (Sherman and Weisburd,
1995) as an example, we identify specific problems investigators are likely
to face in documenting displacement effects. We argue that conventional
studies are unlikely to provide a powerful research design for examining
displacement, in part because of efforts to maximize the identification of
main program effects. In conclusion, we suggest that studies specifically
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designed for measuring displacement (and diffusion) must be developed
if criminologists are to make significant advances in this area.
THE MINNEAPOLIS HOT SPOTS EXPERIMENT
The Minneapolis Hot Spots Experiment was designed to test the
deterrent effects of uniformed police patrol (in marked cars) directed at
hot spots of crime (Sherman and Weisburd, 1992: 1995). Following upon
evidence that there is a substantial clustering of crime events at particular
addresses in urban areas (see Sherman et al., 1989), Sherman and
Weisburd sought to examine whether a patrol strategy that focused on
crime hot spots would have a higher likelihood of success than the more
general approach used in prior studies of preventive patrol (e.g., see Kelling
et al., 1974). There appeared to be general agreement that preventive
police patrol applied across large areas of a city does not do much to deter
crime (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990; Sherman, 1993). The question
raised in the Minneapolis study was whether such patrol focused on crime
hot spots is likely to have a more significant impact.
While earlier studies had pointed to the concentration of crime (often
measured through emergency calls for service) at discrete street ad-
dresses, they failed to take into account that there is a significant degree
of clustering of hot-spot addresses one around another. This problem was
of particular concern in the Minneapolis study because the crime hot spots
identified would be randomly allocated to a treatment group receiving
significant additional patrol, and a control group that retained "normal"
police service. To randomly allocate addresses immediately adjacent to
each other to separate treatment and control conditions would have
effectively sabotaged the integrity of the treatments administered. Accord-
ingly, Sherman and Weisburd (1995) used computer mapping techniques
to map the location of addresses in which there was a minimum threshold
of three or more emergency calls for service for "hard crimes," primarily
more serious predatory offenses (see Weisburd et al., 1992), during a
one-year period so that they could cluster them into crime hot spots.
In constructing crime hot spots from the 5,538 addresses that met this
criteria, Sherman and Weisburd (1995) sought to identify clusters of
addresses with frequent crime call activity. The boundaries of each hot
spot were limited conceptually as being visible from an "epicenter" (Sher-
man et al., 1989). In practice the hot spots were, with a few exceptions,
limited to one linear block and did not extend more than a half block from
either side of an intersection. Some 420 such hot-spot clusters were
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identified that met a threshold of 20 or more hard crime calls over the
previous year.
A number of these places were excluded after further investigation, and
a number of the hot-spot boundaries redrawn. A primary reason for
exclusion was the assessment that places would not likely be influenced
by increased patrol presence. For example, Sherman and Weisburd (1995)
excluded parks, indoor parking garages and indoor malls. In order to
maximize the statistical stability of estimates in the study, places that
evidenced a great deal of instability in the number of crime call events year
to year were also excluded. This exclusion was based on the statistical
logic that such variability would make it difficult to identify treatment
effects as opposed to natural variation in the number of emergency calls
linked to a particular hot spot.
Finally, in choosing the final 110 places for inclusion in the randomized
experiment, Sherman and Weisburd (1995) sought to identify the highest
activity places in which there was sufficient distance one to another as to
prevent treatment contamination of control locations. This meant in
practice that the hot spots were more than one block away from one
another, and most often not visible one from another.
The 110 hot spots were randomly allocated to control and treatment
groups. The treatment hot spots were to receive "extra patrol," defined at
the outset as an increase of two or three times over the dosage that would
be present in normal police patrol of high-crime areas in Minneapolis. The
goal was to provide three hours per day of intermittent patrol presence
between 11:00 a.m. and 3:00 a.m., the highest crime period. It was
expected that control hot spots would likely receive less attention than
they would under non-experimental conditions because of the concentra-
tion of police efforts in bringing police cars to the treatment locations.
Nonetheless, the fact that all of these locations were likely to generate a
good deal of emergency call activity meant that some degree of preventive
patrol would continue in the control areas as well.
In practice, the Minneapolis Police Department did provide the sought-
after extra dosage to the treatment hot spots during the first six and one
half months of the study. Extra patrol declined significantly during the
remaining period of the study because of unexpected demands on police
service. Sherman and Weisburd (1995) report a significant decline in calls
for service during the first phase of the study, though as was expected this
effect did not continue when the dosage of police patrol declined.3 The
level of decline was of moderate size, with a 19% reduction in total crime
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calls in the experimental hot spots as compared with a 6% reduction in
the control locations.
Sherman and Weisburd (1995) argue that their main task was to
identify whether hot-spots patrol could deter crime calls at the treatment
(as contrasted with control) locations. Given the prevailing skepticism
about the effectiveness of preventive patrol, they placed the emphasis of
their research design and evaluation efforts on detection of such impacts
if they existed. At the same time, once it was established that such patrol
did affect crime calls in the study locations, it was natural to ask whether
it had displaced crime calls to other locations.
This concern was commonly stated by police in Minneapolis, who often
resented the interference of the study design in patrol activities. While
there was relatively little subversion of the study, it was common for police
officers to remark that crime was "just moving around the corner." This
argument, of course, also served the function of providing a reasonable
voice to a basic patrol officer complaint about the study—that it limited
their freedom in choosing where to patrol. Nonetheless, it raised what is
clearly an important question, once Sherman and Weisburd (1995) had
established a treatment impact: Does the very concentrated character of
hot-spots patrol result in a simple shift of crime activities to adjacent
places? We sought to answer this basic question in the context of an
analysis of calls for service in areas surrounding the hot spots examined
by Sherman and Weisburd. However, as we illustrate below, the design of
a study that seeks to maximize evaluation of direct treatment effects may
hinder assessment of displacement effects.
PROBLEMS IN MEASURING SPATIAL DISPLACEMENT
Our first task in measuring immediate spatial displacement was to
identify which sites to include in our analyses. Though overall there was
a significant decline in crime calls in the experimental as compared to the
control sites in Minneapolis, when we examined each of the sites as
independent units we did not find a constant change across sites. As would
be expected, there was a good deal of variability within the treatment group
in terms of the overall mean changes in crime calls recorded. In some
experimental sites there was little change, in others a very strong deterrent
impact, and in a few others a "backfire" or increase in crime relative to the
control sites as a whole. In our view it did not make sense to examine
displacement in treatment locations that did not show a deterrent effect.
Accordingly, we chose not to examine all of the 55 treatment hot spots,
but only those in which there was a significant decline in crime calls during
the experimental period as compared with the pre-experimental year
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(using a 5% significance threshold). There were 13 such hot spots in the
experimental group. Importantly, there were also seven hot spots in the
control group that met this threshold. For comparative purposes these
were examined as well.
Having chosen these specific sites for analysis, the next concern was
to establish a displacement area around them. We decided upon a
two-block radius for the "catchment" area because we felt it a reasonable
compromise between competing problems of a washout of displacement
impact and a failure to provide adequate distance to identify immediate
spatial displacement. While we recognized at the outset that we would
miss the movement of crime more than two blocks away from a hot spot,
given our measure of crime as a general rather than specific indicator we
did not think it practical to identify all the potential places that might
provide opportunity for displaced offenders. Such a strategy would have
been more appropriate in the case, for example, of drug markets (e.g., see
Green, 1995).
But even taking this compromise approach, we were faced with some
immediate difficulties. While Sherman and Weisburd (1995) designed their
study with the goal of reducing treatment contamination, they did not focus
at the outset on potential displacement contamination. Their priority in
choosing locations was based on ensuring the integrity of the experiment
and not in simplifying measurement of displacement, which would only
become a concern once it had been established that hot spots patrol could
indeed reduce crime calls in the treatment areas. Sherman and Weisburd
thus paid a good deal of attention to ensuring that there was enough
distance between study sites to minimize overlap in the application of
treatment. But it would have seriously reduced the number of high activity
hot spots they could have included in the study if they had required a
two-block free area around every hot spot examined.
This point is well-illustrated when we examine the overlap of the
displacement catchment areas for the 20 hot spots that showed a statis-
tically significant decline (see Figure 1). Nine of them overlap to some
degree, and in some cases the catchment areas of multiple hot spots are
found linked to one another. The problem here is not just catchment areas,
but also overlap of catchment areas over the hot spots themselves.
Accordingly, even taking this relatively conservative approach of only a
two-block catchment threshold, one is likely to cover a fairly broad area.
We think that this problem is not unique to Sherman and Weisburd's
(1995) study, and is likely to plague most hot-spots investigations that are
pursued in urban areas.
This problem also illustrates the fact that there is often a conflict
between models for evaluation of the primary impacts of a study and
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Figure 1: Minneapolis Hot Spots
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methods for measuring displacement. The question the investigator must
ask is: Is it reasonable to potentially weaken the study design for measur-
ing direct effects, with the purpose of facilitating evaluation of displace-
ment? The problem is that many studies fail to show any program impact,
and therefore the investigator is understandably hesitant to do anything
that might weaken his or her basic study design.
A second problem that develops from the choice of a two-block dis-
placement area is less apparent but illustrates a more general difficulty
in measuring the movement of crime after an intervention. Despite the fact
that recent research on the distribution of crime emphasizes that even in
"bad" neighborhoods many areas are relatively free of crime (e.g., see
Weisburd and Green, 1994), it is quite common for high activity locations
to be clustered within such neighborhoods. Using even a relatively small
catchment area, the investigator is likely to encounter a large number of
events near to treated locations. While a very large program effect would
offset this problem somewhat, it is useful to keep in mind that relatively
few criminal justice studies show even a moderate impact on crime (see
Farrington, 1983; Weisburd, 1993).
The absolute number of calls that account for change in each Minne-
apolis hot spot year-to-year is small relative to the total number of crime
calls in the displacement catchment areas (see Table 1). A change, for
example, of 49 crime calls in hot spot D3 leads to a finding of a significant
change year-to-year within the hot spot itself, but it is unlikely to amount
to very much when it is spread to a surrounding displacement catchment
area that includes 1,116 crime calls in a year. Accordingly, despite the fact
that we limited the displacement area to two blocks, the number of crime
calls in the surrounding blocks make it relatively difficult to define any
changes there as resulting from a displacement of offenders or their
crimes. Obviously this problem would have been more severe had we
chosen to track displacement in a larger area. More generally, Barr and
Pease (1990) suggest that the "wider the scope" of a study in terms "of
types of crimes and places," "the thinner the patina of displaced crime
could be spread across them; thus disappearing into the realm of mea-
surement error" (pp. 23-24).
More recent interest in the question of diffusion of benefits (see Clarke
and Weisburd, 1994) complicates the problem of assessing immediate
spatial displacement even further. Clarke and Weisburd (1994) define
diffusion of benefits, in part, as "the spread of the beneficial influence of
an intervention beyond the places which are directly targeted" (p. 169). If,
as Clarke and Weisburd suspect, it is often the case that areas immediate
to an intervention gain a crime control benefit from it, then measures of
displacement will be confounded.4 For example, if there is a diffusion-of-
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Table 1: Change in Hot-Spot Call Totals and
N of Calls in Displacement Areas
benefits effect and a displacement effect of equal measure, then we would
observe no change in the displacement catchment area. While in some
sense this would indicate no displacement, in another it masks the
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complexity of two competing processes that cancel each other out (Green,
1995).
IMPLICATIONS
Our examination of data from the Minneapolis Hot Spots Experiment
leads us to two basic conclusions. The first is that one must be extraor-
dinarily cautious in analyzing and interpreting data on immediate spatial
displacement. Statistics that appear solid on paper may reflect the diffi-
culties of analyzing this process as much as any real substantive findings.
In particular, we are concerned about the potential biases here toward the
null hypothesis of no displacement in hot-spot studies.
Our second conclusion is that real progress in the study of displace-
ment and the related phenomenon of diffusion cannot be made until we
place these problems as central rather than secondary issues of study.
For the most part, scholars have encountered the problem of displacement
only after they have established a direct program impact. The approach
to its study has been primarily defensive, a method for establishing that
a gain was really made. The Minneapolis Hot Spots Experiment illustrates
what we think is a more general problem in such analyses: there is often
a tension between research design for measuring direct and displacement
effects.
Resources are generally scarce in criminal justice research. It makes
good sense to invest such resources first in establishing a main effect.
And, indeed, displacement is potentially so diffuse that the very expensive
process of developing good data on it could in this regard overwhelm even
a large study (Barr and Pease, 1990). That displacement is of interest only
if a main effect is established naturally pushes it to the back burner until
resources have been spent on other, more pressing, research problems.
In order to develop a better understanding of displacement and diffu-
sion, however, studies must be initiated that focus specifically on these
phenomena. Such studies could be designed to define how far and under
what circumstances crime will be displaced. They could at the outset
identify problems and places that provide sufficient numbers of cases in
target and catchment areas for statistically powerful analyses. Because
they would not be constrained by focus on direct effects, they could also
design out problems of displacement contamination and differentiate
potential displacement and diffusion impacts. Direct program impacts
would not be problematic in such studies. Accordingly, investigators
would examine displacement in a context in which it is already clear that
there is an effect that is possible to displace or diffuse. Their efforts would
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be invested in tracking and understanding the nature of that process and
not in establishing the efficacy of interventions themselves.
Our point is really a simple one. It is time to move displacement from
a secondary to a primary focus of criminological study. Only then will we
be able to gain reliable estimates of displacement effects on crime preven-
tion initiatives.
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NOTES
1. Sutherland (1947) for example, recognized that specific circumstances
are needed for a crime to occur. Nevertheless, while arguing that the
situation does impact crime in many ways, he notes that "the least
important [of these) is the provision of opportunity for a criminal act" (p.5).
For Sutherland, the task of the criminologist is not to focus on the problem
of opportunity itself but on why certain people and not others take
advantage of such situational opportunities for crime.
2. For important exceptions to this trend, see Barr and Pease, (1990) and
Pease (1993).
3. It is interesting to note that the impacts of the treatment did not dissipate
immediately following the implementation breakdown in the study. Sher-
man and Weisburd (1992) report a degree of residual deterrence.
4. Eck (1993) suggests that the proximity of sites in many evaluation
designs is likely to lead to a bias toward finding crime reduction impacts.
In this case, crime may be displaced from the treatment to control location,
thus exaggerating the impact of the intervention.
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